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Abstract 
This research was intended to assess the effects of Mandatory audit firm rotation on audit quality in Zimbabwe. 
The suspicion that auditors’ independence has been compromised as some companies do not rotate their auditors 
has prompted the researcher to carry out this study. The focus of this study, objectives, were to identify the 
effects of Mandatory audit firm rotation on audit quality, to determine the effects of audit tenure length on audit 
quality and to suggest measures that can be put in place to promote Mandatory audit firm rotation. A descriptive 
research design was adopted as it provides a picture of a situation as it naturally happens. A sample of 33 
companies was selected out of the study population of 77 companies which is made up of 15 auditing firms listed 
on ZSE directory under category of auditing service and 62 companies which represented all the firms that are 
listed on the Zimbabwe Stock Exchange. Primarydata was collected using questionnaires whereas secondary 
data was mainly collected from journals and other prior researchers work.  Pearson regression and correlation 
analysis from the SPSS revealed that there is a strong positive linear relationship between Mandatory audit firm 
rotation and audit quality, while a strong negative correlation of existsbetween the length of audit tenure and 
audit quality. The study also reveal that that law enforcement, conducting workshops and training stakeholders 
are the possible measures that can be put in place to promote mandatory audit firm rotation. 
Keywords: Mandatory audit rotation, Audit tenure, Audit quality. 
 
1.0 Background of the study 
The major financial failures at Enron and WorldCom, as well as apparent failures at Qwest, Tyco, Adelphia, and 
others led to financial reporting reforms contained in the Sarbanes – Oxley Act of 2002 (SOA), (Arel, Brody, & 
Pany, 2005). SOA’s have resulted in theformation of Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB) 
and introducing mandatory rotation of lead and reviewing audit partners after five consecutive years on an 
engagement, (Arel, Brody, & Pany, 2005). A Mandatory audit firm rotation rule sets a limit on the maximum 
number of years an audit firm can audit a given company’s financial statements and is meant to often to preserve 
auditor independence and possibly to increase investors’ confidence in financial reports (Cameran, 
Prencipe&Trombetta, 2008). TheEuropean Commission has proposed mandatory rotation for all European listed 
companies (European Commission, 2011).  
 Mandatory audit firm rotation (MAFR) rule was introduced and enforced for all listed companies in 
Italy in 1975 and the rule became effective for all listed companies in the mid-Eighties. The regulation allowed 
an auditor term to be renewed every three years up to a maximum tenure of nine years and Italian listed 
companies were subject to both a retention and a rotation rule (Cameran, Prencipe&Trombetta, 2008). In 
Netherlands there is a new Dutch law related to auditing, known as the Dutch Audit Profession Act which 
imposes an eight-year audit firm rotation period and sharply restricts non-audit services (Earnest and Young, 
2014). In the US, the Government Accountability Office (GAO), was instructed by the SEC to investigate the 
issue of MAFR and the investigation by GAO concluded that there are no clear the potential benefits of a MAFR 
rule (GAO 2008). 
In August 2011, the Public Company Accountability Oversight Board (PCAOB) in the US issued the 
Concept Release, Auditor Independence and Audit Firm Rotation, whichconsiders mandatory audit firm rotation, 
but did not specify a time frame (Chartered Accountants of Canada, 2012).Whereas in some countries like Italy, 
South Korea, and Spain mandatory audit firm rotation exists (Cameran et al. 2011, Kwon et al. 2010, Arrunada 
and Pas Arez 1997). Such a rule can have severe implications on the way the audit market behaves as it affects 
both the costs of audit firms, in respect of time and effort invested, but also the companies being audited (Ernst 
and Young, 2013) whereas the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 required the General Accounting Office to study the 
potential effects of mandatory auditor rotation in strengthening auditors’ resistance to opinion shopping threats, 
some scholars advocate a policy of mandatory auditor retention to mitigate companies’ opinion shopping 
opportunities (Lennox,1998).However Mazri and Smith (2012) stated that companies change auditors for a 
variety of reasons, some changes to improve operating performance on the other hand management may change 
auditors to enhance their personal interests.Nyakuwana, (2014) highlighted that not many countries have yet 
introduced this rule as part of legislature, and neither has Zimbabwe  
The ICAZ IFRS update seminar which was held on 13 October 2013 for the purpose of revising 
Zimbabwe Stock Exchange (ZSE) listing requirements, proposed rotation of auditors (ICAZ, 2013). ZSE (2013) 
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stated that from our stakeholder consultations, in the eyes of the investors, rotation of auditors seems to be a 
good way to mitigate the risk of collusion between management and the auditors. This is not to say that auditors 
are not professional but is aimed at highlighting the perception that is out there(ICAZ, 2013). ZSE, (2013) also 
proposed that the auditors of the listed company should be changed every 5 years to demonstrate independence 
in form and appearance.  
Report on the observance of standards and codes (ROSC) Auditing and Accounting Zimbabwe (2011) 
highlighted that Audit firm rotations are mostly taking place in bank audits at the insistence of the Reserve Bank 
of Zimbabwe. However there are some locally listed companies in Zimbabwe that have been audited by the same 
audit firm for over 30 years. In the absence of audit practice reviews at the moment, it is not possible to establish 
whether partner rotations are taking place in the audit firms as a safeguard against independence and over-
familiarity threats. Some stakeholders interviewed expressed concern over close relationships between some 
companies and their auditors in different forms that compromise auditor independence (ROSC A&A, 2011) The 
relationship between audit tenure and audit quality remains controversial (Khasharmeh& Said, 2014). Many 
believe that the longer the audit tenure, the lower the audit quality (negative correlation) due to the closer 
relationship between auditors and management (Catanach& Walker, 1999; Vanstraelen, 2000). This closer 
relationship creates more flexibility for the management to produce financial statements in the auditor’s favor 
(Davis, Soo, &Trompeter, 2002), while others believe that the longer the audit tenure, the higher the audit 
quality (positive correlation) (Geiger &Raghunandan, 2002).Therefore this research seek to examine the 
relationship between Mandatory audit firm rotation and Audit quality in Zimbabwe. 
 
2.0 Literature Review 
2.1 History on Mandatory audit firm rotation 
The history on Mandatory audit firm rotation can be traced back to 1977, when Congress created the Cohen 
Commission after several corporate scandals (Committee reports 2013-2014; Cohen, 1977). The Cohen 
Commission eventually ruled against Mandatory audit firm rotation, and rather suggested that audit committees 
retain discretion in choosing whether to rotate audit firms or periodically rotate auditors among the auditing team 
of the auditing firm. Mandatory audit firm rotation surfaced again in 2002 amid congressional level headed 
discussion on what eventually got to be Sarbanes-Oxley, but was again rejected (Committee reports, 2013 – 
2014). However Kim et al (2015) highlighted that regulators and policy makers all over the world began to 
consider the adoption of Mandatory audit firm rotation (MAFR) as the world is in the middle of recent global 
financial crisis.In November 2003, as required under Sarbanes-Oxley, GAO issued a study on the potential 
effects of MAFR, which finished up that Mandatory audit firm rotation may not be the most efficient approach to 
fortify auditor independence and enhance audit quality (Committee reports, 2013 – 2014). In August 2011 
following eight years of alterations established by SOX, the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board 
(PCOAB) stated that the time of reconsidering MAFR has come again and the need to consider “ending a firm’s 
ability to turn each appointment into a continuing income stream” and “as a result, significantly enhance the 
auditor’s ability to work as an independent watchdogs” (PCOAB Release No. 2011-006). However the U.S. 
House of Representatives in July 2013, endorsed a bill called Audit integrity act which refrained PCAOB from 
implementing mandatory audit firm rotation (Nichols, 2013; Federation of European Accountants, 2013). 
However the European Union Council on December 18 2013, released a document called "Agreement 
on the reform of the audit market” which revealed a new rule (Regulation 537/2014/EU) in regards to mandatory 
audit rotation for European organisations. All the public- interest entities (PIEs) which were based in Europe, 
including banks, insurance and listed firms, were required from the second quarter of 2014, to change their 
auditing firms after a 10 year audit tenure. However, the mandatory rotation period can be extended to 20 years 
if the audit is put out for offer, or 24 years in cases of joint audits. This rule of Mandatory audit firm rotation 
measure came into practice in order to improve transparency and confidence in the audit market and also to 
enhance audit quality offered by auditing firms (Sotirios, 2014; Tysiac, 2014; European Commission, 2014).In 
Italy, Mandatory audit firm rotation rule was enforced in 1975 by Presidential Decree D.P.R. 136/1975 and it has 
been effect for more than 20 years. However it became effective for all listed companies in Italy in the mid-
Eighties. In this Italian setting, auditors can be appointed for a time period 3 years and can be reappointed twice 
up to a maximum tenure of 9 years. In Spain, the Statutory Audit Law of 1988 Mandatory audit firm rotation 
was enforced for a period of four years which is from 1991 to 1994. However the rule was later dropped before 
the first mandatory rotations could take place (FEE, 2004; Cameran, Prencipe and Trombetta, 2008). 
Nevertheless Carrera et al (2007) asserted that, the dropping of Mandatory audit firm rotation policy was 
politically influenced, thus, Spanish regulators are reconsidering whether a case exists to re-establish the MAFR 
requirement. 
Firth et al (2012) highlighted that China has different kinds of mandatory rotations such as mandatory 
audit firm rotation and mandatory audit partner rotation. In addition South Korea and Jordan have also adopted 
mandatory audit firm rotation rule (Harris and Whisenant, 2012; Al-Nimer, 2015). Kwon, Lim and Simnett 
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(2010) document that   MAFR was enforced in Korea in 2006 by the Korean Financial Supervisory Services 
(FSS).The legislation required the incumbent audit firm to be rotated after seven years so as to reduce auditors’ 
incentives to build a long-term relationships with their clients so that their choices for conservative accounting 
preferences may be induced (Kwon, Lim and Simnett, 2010).Furthermore Brazil enforced mandatory audit firm 
rotation rule for listed companies except banks and China have imposed this rule on state owned entities and 
financial enterp-rises (Said and Khasharmeh, 2014). Said and Khasharmeh (2014) also point out that some of the 
G20 jurisdictions introduced mandatory audit firm rotation such as Indonesia has introduced laws that  require a 
five- year rotation for the central bank and six year rotation of auditors specifically  for private and public 
companies. Saudi Arabia also introduced MAFR on all listed companies excluding banks and Turkey enforced a 
five- year rotation for all listed entities and energy companies and seven year rotation for insurance organisations 
and eight year rotation for banks (IESBA, 2012). 
 
2.2Relationship between Mandatory Audit Firm Rotation and audit quality  
Onwuchekwa, Erah and Izedonmi, (2012) used aregression statistical model to test the relationship between the 
dependent audit quality” and audit “tenure” and concluded that rotation of auditors may improve the quality of 
audit.Kwon, Lim and Simnett (2010) reinforced the prior argument when they argued that, in a setting were audit 
firm rotation is voluntary, audit quality is more likely to diminish for two reasons. The First is that, a client is 
more likely to engage an auditor with audit quality not higher than that of the incumbent auditor. In the case of 
resignation, a client will face difficulties in getting an auditor that can provide the same level of audit quality. In 
the event of dismissal, a client may engage in opinion shopping since there is an incentive to the client to hire an 
auditor who will issue a desired opinion on an accounting matter or on the financial statements as a whole. 
Second, the incoming auditor under the voluntary auditor change setting will not be familiar with the new 
engagement and faces a high learning curve. 
Furthermore Said and Khasharmeh (2014) highlighted that periodically rotating audit firms will allow 
new auditors to bring a fresh look to the public entities’ financial reporting and help the auditor to properly deal 
with issues of financial reporting, since auditor’s tenure will be limited under MAFR. Furthermore smaller and 
medium-sized audit entities will grow which then leads to the development of the auditing profession. Said and 
Khasharmeh (2014) findings also reviewed that there is a noteworthy relationship between MAFR and quality of 
audit. Thus, longer partner tenure jeopardise auditor’s performance as it catalyses auditor’s to lack the quality in 
the auditing process. In addition Dao et al (2008), who conducted a survey on 635 US entities in the business 
year of 2006 and concluded that, in long-term engagements, investors realize a negative impact on audit quality.  
On the other hand opponents of MAFR such as AICPA, cited research indicating that auditor rotation 
may impair audit quality and the longer the audit firm tenure, the more the audit quality increases (Said and 
Khasharmeh, 2014). Other research shows that many audit fiascos occur soon after a client changes audit 
companies (Davis et al, 2009; Gul et al, 2009). PricewaterhouseCoopers (2012) also argued that Mandatory audit 
firm rotation will reduce audit and financial reporting quality. Furthermore Said and Khasharmeh (2014) 
believed that MAFR would decrease audit quality, make financial reporting less authentic, and add cost for 
investors. Ernst and Young (2013) also argued that MAFR has not proven to boost audit quality; indeed, some 
studies have reviewed that it may negatively affect audit quality particularly where there are shorter rotation 
periods (Cameran, Prencipe and Trombetta, 2013). 
Furthermore the view of opponents of MAFR is reinforced by a study carried in Italy, the research 
concluded that MAFR was hurtful to audit quality since it increased start-up costs and caused disruptions in the 
appointment phase (Kwon, Lim and Simnett, 2010). Ruiz-Barbadillo et al (2009) examined the impact of MAFR 
on auditor behaviour in the Spanish context and found no proof that a mandatory rotation requisite is allied with 
a higher probability of issuing going-concern opinions.In addition to the prior discussion, Mandatory audit firm 
rotation causes audit risk, below standard audit implementation, in the early years of audit engagements, because 
an auditor may has not comprehensively understood his/her clients (Beatty, 1989; Craswell, Francis, and Taylor, 
1995). DeAngelo (1981) believed that audit quality is the combination between auditor’s independence and 
competence. Therefore Said and Khasharmeh (2014) predicted that there is a positive relationship between the 
auditor’s competency and tenure. Thus, the longer the tenure, the higher the auditor’s competency since the 
auditor gets a better understanding of the firm’s specific risks, accounting information system and internal 
controls (Said and Khasharmeh, 2014). Also Al-Thuneibat et al (2011) pointed out that, there is a negative 
correlation between MAFR and the quality of auditing in companies listed at the stock exchange of Jordan 
between 2002 and 2006. 
 
2.3 Effects of long-term auditor-client relationship on audit quality 
Kwon, Lim and Simnett (2010) opine that the independence of auditors is compromised with long-term 
relationships between auditors and clients thereby affecting audit quality. International Federation of 
Accountants (IFAC) and US Government Accountability Office (GAO) argued that long-term relationship 
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between the auditors and their clients compromise auditor independence and consequently, the objectivity in the 
audit (IFAC, 2003; GAO, 2004; EU, 2010). Furthermore, close association between audit firm and client could 
give rise to opinion shopping since it may lead to an eagerness of auditors to please the client instead of being 
the objective third party (Arel et al, 2005).In addition, proponents of Mandatory Audit Firm Rotation (MAFR) 
have suggested that impairment of auditors’ independence can lead to auditors’ support for more aggressive 
accounting choices that are not acceptable by GAAP and can ultimately result in a failure to detect material fraud 
and/or misstatements (Kwon, Lim and Simnett, 2010) Mautz and Sharaf (1961) opine that long-term auditor 
client relationship have negative effect on auditor independence since  auditor’s objectivity about a client 
decreases over time. Furthermore Harris and Whisenant (2012) reinforced the argument that long-term auditor 
relationship hampers audit quality when they argued that, an improvement in either competence or independence 
would lead to enhancement in audit quality. Burton and Roberts (1967) suggested that personal relationship 
among the auditor and management is a determining factor towards reducing audit quality. Furthermore 
proponents of MAFR believe that the longer the audit tenure, the lower the audit quality (negative correlation) 
due to the closer relationship between auditors and management (Catanach and Walker, 1999;Vanstraelen, 2000). 
This closer relationship causes the auditor and the client to engage in opinion shopping and thus audit quality 
will diminishes as there is a possibility of not adhering to financial reporting standards in support of aggressive 
accounting reporting methods (Davis, Soo and Trompeter, 2002 ; Said and Khasharmeh, 2014).  
However on the other hand Davis, Soo and Trompeter (2002) pointed out that, others believe that the 
longer the audit tenure, the greater the audit quality (positive correlation) (Geiger and Raghunandan, 2002; Said 
and Khasharmeh, 2014).This view was reinforced by Jackson et al (2008) suggested that, in the Australian 
capital market between 1995 and 2003 that the likelihood of restricted going concern opinions increases with the 
period of the audit tenure due to the auditor's experience. Chi, Huang, Liao, and Xie (2009) also find some 
evidence that audit quality of entities subject to Mandatory audit firm rotation in 2004 is higher than audit 
quality of organisations not subject to rotation in 2004.In addition, Myers et al (2003) and Kaplan and Mauldin 
(2008) they found that earnings quality to be greater with longer term auditor firm-client relationships because 
auditors with longer tenure put greater constraints on managers. Furthermore Pierre and Anderson (1984) and 
Stice (1991) pointed out that, audit failures and lawsuits tend to be largely experienced in the initial years of an 
audit engagement and thus, long-term auditor- client relationship will enhance the audit quality. Geiger and 
Raghunandan (2002) also renforced the view that the longer the audit tenure the better the audit quality. 
Carcello and Nagy (2004) highligted that the probability of material misstatements in financial 
reporting is higher in the first years of the audit firm’s tenure and is not substantially higher for instances of 
long-term audit tenure. Casterella (2010) also pointed out that a research conducted in 2004, which used a 
sample of companies charged by the Security Exchange Commission (SEC) with fraudulent financial reporting 
concluded that undetected fraud is more likely in the initial years of the auditor-client relationship.Furthermore 
the above argument was reinforced by Said and Khasharmeh (2014) when they pointed out that, through long-
term auditor-client relationship, the auditor attains appropriate or significant knowledge and understanding of an 
entities operations over time risks associated with the company, which thereby enhance audit quality. Myers et al 
(2004) concluded there is no relationship between the nature and sternness of the restatement and auditor tenure. 
 
2.4Measures to be put in place to promote Mandatory Audit Firm Rotation 
2.4.1Law Enforcements 
In Australia a legislation called Corporations Act 2001 was enforced which required listed companies on the 
Austria Stock Exchange to mandatorily rotate their auditors (Ottaway, 2013).Ian Mackintosh, Australian 
Securities and Investments Commission (ASIC) then Chief Accountant pointed out auditor’s predicament in 
regards to maintaining auditor independence, he stressed out that auditors are in the centre of a minefield as the 
paradox of being expected to reconcile a commercial service provider/client relationship with a 
whistleblowing/watchdog responsibility. The service provider/client relationship is supported by commercial 
incentive and the public responsibility role is supported by very little legislative or other incentive, yet the public 
except auditors to perform as “contracted regulators” of financial reporting which might be difficult under these 
circumstances (Ottaway, 2013). Thus there is a need of enforcing Mandatory audit rotation to guide against loss 
of auditors independence (Kwon et al., 2010). 
Furthermore ICAZ (2013) pointed out that, ZSE has suggested that Mandatory audit firm rotation 
should be enforced on all listed companies on the Zimbabwe Stock Exchange, as one of its listing requirements. 
Furthermore the dangers of not complying with this rule on listed companies will be penalties. This move is 
believed to be a good practice in terms of corporate governance in the eyes of investors since it mitigate the risk 
of collusion between the auditor and management. The enforcement of this rule is aimed at highlighting the 
perception out there that auditors should demonstrate independence in appearance and form, thus the proposal of 
the enforcement of this rule is not to say auditors are not professional (ICAZ, 2013).In addition ZSE proposed to 
fine issuers and sponsors if non-compliance with the requirement is noted. This was noted that administrative 
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fines is a new concept on the ZSE but they exist in JSE and LSE and other markets (ICAZ, 2013). Loewenstein 
(1997) pointed out that SEC is considering the increase for penalties for proven auditor bias cases. 
2.4.2Conducting workshops 
In a letter by Jonathan Faull, European Commission (EU), (2014) document that following the adoption MAFR 
enforced by the new Regulation 537/2014/EU regarding statutory audits of PIEs, the commission will provide 
assistance in informing all stakeholders about the new rule in order to maintain a level playing field in the audit 
market. Furthermore regulators, supervisors and stakeholders’ practical questions about the implementation of 
the new legislation of MAFR will be clarified or addressed in a first specific workshop to be held (European 
Commission, 2014). Furthermore International Ethics Standards Board for Accountants (IESBA), (2015) pointed 
out that European Commission was organising workshops for its Member States regards to implementation of 
Mandatory audit firm rotation. 
BDO (2014) also pointed out that workshops which are being currently held by the European 
Commission with its Member States is of the purpose of clarifying the implementation issues arising from the 
adoption MAFR rule and to ensure consistency application of the new rule by all Member States. Arruñada and 
Paz-Ares (1997) also supported the above view when they documented that comments received from participants’ 
commentators at the workshop of Economic Analysis of Law at the Universidad Carlos III in Madrid were 
gratefully acknowledged. This workshop was supported by DGICYT, scientific agency of the Spanish 
government.In addition Stephen Haddrill, Chief Executive officer of Financial Reporting council UK, 
documented that there was stakeholder workshop held in Brussels on 4 March 2016. The workshop was mainly 
focused on the implementation of Audit Regulation and Directive (ARD) changes to UK regulation of audit and 
one of the regulation change being enforced was audit rotation and retendering (FRC, 2016). 
2.4.3 Training Stakeholders 
Training stakeholders on Mandatory audit firm rotation plays a major role in promoting the adoption of the 
legislation. This will provide appropriate professional development among stakeholders for instance auditors 
technical competence will be enhanced ( i.e if ICAZ venture into training courses about MAFR in universities 
and at a professional level), (Integrity Development guide, 2012).Furthermore  Loewenstein (1997) notes that   
training programs helps in making awareness. This was enforced by IASB (2010) suggested through ISQC 1, 
that actions such as legal and regulatory requirements may be communicated by but not restricted to training 
seminars, meetings, formal or informal dialogue. 
 
3.0 Research Methodology 
The descriptive research design was used for the purpose of this study. Descriptive studies are concerned with 
the what, where and how of a phenomenon hence more placed to build a profile on that phenomenon (Mugenda 
and Mugenda, 2003). Ruling out relationships among variables in the descriptive research process is labelled as 
correlation study which, according to Cooper and Schindler (2003), is a subset of descriptive study. Burns and 
Groove (2003), pointed out that a descriptive research design provides a picture of a situation as it naturally 
happens. It may also be used for further developments, justify the current practice and make judgments. 
Descriptive survey often uses questionnaire to collect information by asking the same questions to all 
respondents, possibly under the same circumstances to achieve that level of consistency hence research 
questionnaire was used. 
The study was based on audit firms on the ZSE directory and all firms listed on the ZSE. Therefore the 
population of the study totaled to 77 including 15 auditing firms listed on ZSE directory under category of 
auditing service and 62 companies which represented all the firms that are listed on the Zimbabwe Stock 
Exchange website. The sample size for the study was 33 companies comprising of 15 auditing firms listed on the 
auditing service on the Zimbabwe stock exchange and 18 listed companies picked from each sector. The sample 
size comprised of one managing partner from each audit firm and one audit committee member from each of the 
listed companies on the ZSE. Law (2012) highlighted that a sample size of 30% of the population can fairly 
represent the population and therefore 30% of the population, in this case would be 23 firms. However the 33 out 
of 77respondents (43%) was used in the study which is slightly higher as advocated by Law (2012). Non-
probability sampling which helps researchers to select units from a population that they are interested in studying. 
The non-probability sampling technique used was purposive sampling. Purposive sampling relies on the 
judgement of the researcher when it comes to selecting the units that are to be studied (,Saunders, 2012). The 
researcher used his judgment and selected 15 managing partners from each of the 15 auditing firms selected and 
one member of the audit committees of the 18 listed companies selected so as to obtain an accurate 
representation of the phenomena at hand as the study requires technical respondents. Therefore the concentration 
on people with particular characteristics assisted in obtaining relevant information about the research study. 
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4.0Results and discussion 
4.1Effects of Mandatory audit firm rotation on audit quality 
Table 4.1: Regression Model Summary 
Model R R Square Adjusted R Square Std. Error of the Estimate 
1 .971a .942 .942 .310 
a. Predictors: (Constant), Mandatory audit firm rotation 
Table 4.1 above indicates a simple linear regression model summary, which clearly shows that R = 
0.971. R is a measurement of strength in association between Mandatory audit firm rotation and audit quality and 
since the degree of relationship existing between Mandatory audit firm rotation and audit quality is equal to 
97.1%, it shows that there is a strong positive relationship between the two variables. In addition the R Square = 
0.942 which indicates that there is a 94.2% level in the coefficient of determination. Thus mandatory audit firm 
rotation determine the level of audit quality to the rate of 94.2% and these indicates a strong degree of 
determination between the two variables.Furthermore the above findings that there is a strong positive 
relationship between Mandatory audit firm rotation and audit quality are inconsistency with Said and 
Khasharmeh (2014) findings that, there is a noteworthy relationship between Mandatory audit firm rotation and 
quality of the audits. However these findings did not converge with the findings of Al-Thuneibat et al (2011) 
who highlighted that, there is a negative correlation between MAFR and the quality of auditing 
 
4.2Relationship between Length of audit tenure and audit quality 
Table 4.2: Length audit tenure and audit quality 
 Length of audit tenure Audit quality 
Length of audit tenure 
Pearson Correlation 1 -.732** 
Sig. (2-tailed)  .001 
N 28 28 
Audit quality 
Pearson Correlation -.732** 1 
Sig. (2-tailed) .001  
N 28 28 
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
Table 4.2 above shows that there is a strong negative relationship of -0.732 between the length of audit 
tenure and audit quality. This means that the longer the audit tenure, the lower the audit quality. These findings 
are inconsistency with Vanstraelen (2000) findings that the longer the audit tenure, the lower the audit quality 
(negative correlation) due to the closer relationship between auditors and management. However  Davis, Soo and 
Trompeter (2002) findings were in disagreement with the results obtained in table 4.5 above, they  pointed out 
that the longer the audit tenure, the greater the audit quality (positive correlation). 
 
4.3Measures to be put in place to promote Mandatory Audit Firm Rotation  
4.3.1. Law Enforcement 
Results indicates that 24 out of 28(86%)agreed while 4 out of 28(14%) did not agree with the assertion that law 
enforcement can be one of the measures to put in place to promote Mandatory audit firm rotation. This view 
converged with Ottaway (2013) view that audit firm rotation can be promoted through law enforcement such as 
what Australia had done, it enforced a legislation called Corporations Act 2001 which required listed companies 
on the Austria Stock Exchange to mandatorily rotate their auditors. 
4.3.2Conducting Training Workshops 
Results reveal that 22 out of 28(79%) agreed  while 6 out of 28 (21%) disagreed  to the notion that   that 
workshops will provide assistance in providing assistance in the understanding of the legislation requirements 
and also provide opportunities for clarifying implementation issues that might arise. These findings are in line 
with IESBA (2015) initiative that the European Commission should organize workshops for its Member States 
with regards to the implementation of Mandatory audit firm rotation. 
 
5.0Conclusions and Recommendations 
5.1 conclusions 
The research conclusions were derived from the research findings. The study concluded that there is a strong 
positive relationshipbetween Mandatory audit firm rotation and audit quality. Thus the quality of audits improves 
when audit firms are mandatorily rotated. The study also concluded that there is a strong negative correlation 
between audit tenure length and audit quality.Thus the longer the audit tenure the lower the audit quality. The 
study concluded that law enforcement, conducting workshop and training stakeholders are the measures that 
promote adoption of Mandatory audit firm rotation. 
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• The government should consider crafting a piece of legislation on Mandatory audit firm rotation in 
Zimbabwe. 
• The government should enforce the ZSE to adopt the legislation as its one of the listing requirements. 
• The government should put in place penalties for companies that do not comply with the legislation.  
• PAAB should constantly audit the audit firms to ensure compliance. 
• The Institute of Chartered Accountancy in Zimbabwe (ICAZ) should introduce courses with regards to the 
legislation, that assist in training stakeholders especially in the tertiary institutions in order promote the 
adoption of the legislation. 
• The limit on audit firm tenure should not be more than 10 years. 
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